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13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
14 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
15 (SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION)

16 YVETTE FELARCA, LORI NIXON, LARRY  
17 STEFL,

18 Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

19 v.

20 BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,  
21 DONALD EVANS, JANET LEVENSON,  
22 et al.,

23 Defendants/Respondents..

No. 3:17-cv-06282-VC

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION  
FOR LEAVE TO FILE PROPOSED  
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF  
BERKELEY FEDERATION OF  
TEACHERS IN SUPPORT OF  
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Date: January 18, 2018  
Time: 10:00 a.m.  
Ctrm.: 2, 17th Floor  
Place: San Francisco Courthouse  
450 Golden Gate Avenue  
San Francisco, CA 94102

Judge: Hon. Vince Chhabria

24 TO EACH PARTY AND ATTORNEYS OF RECORD IN THIS ACTION:

25 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 18, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as  
26 this matter can be heard in Courtroom 2 of the United States District Court, Northern District of  
27 California, San Francisco Division, on the 17th Floor at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco,  
28 California, the Berkeley Federation of Teachers, AFT Local 1078 (“Union”) will move for leave  
to file an *amicus curiae* brief in support of Plaintiffs Felarca, Nixon, and Stefl. The Union met  
and conferred with the parties to this litigation about the Union’s motion. Plaintiffs and

1 Defendants have responded that they consent to this motion. Intervenor, Judicial Watch, Inc.,  
2 responded that it does not consent.

3 **I. STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE *AMICUS CURIAE* BRIEF**

4 “District courts frequently welcome *amicus* briefs from non-parties concerning legal  
5 issues that have potential ramifications beyond the parties directly involved or if the amicus has  
6 unique information or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the  
7 parties are able to provide.” *Sonoma Falls Devs., LLC v. Nev. Gold & Casinos, Inc.*, 272 F. Supp.  
8 2d 919, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2003.) This standard is met here.

9 **II. STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE***

10 The Berkeley Federation of Teachers, AFT Local 1078 (“Union”) is a labor organization  
11 affiliated with the California Federation of Teachers and the American Federation of Teachers,  
12 and serves as the collective bargaining representative of 920 teachers (K-12, Adult School, and  
13 Child Development), counselors, substitutes, school psychologists, Adaptive PE teachers,  
14 librarians and speech pathologists serving Berkeley public school students.

15 The Union has an interest in this case because it concerns the potential disclosure of  
16 information that interferes with the personal safety and the constitutionally protected privacy and  
17 associational rights of employees represented by the Union. The Union is especially concerned  
18 about Intervenor’s effort to use the California Public Records Act as a vehicle to jeopardize the  
19 safety of public employees and/or to chill protected speech and silence the exchange of opinions  
20 among all members of the Union. Although Plaintiffs Felarca and Stefl are both teachers and in  
21 the bargaining unit represented by the Union, they are only in one of the various classifications of  
22 public school educators and staff who are included in the bargaining unit.

23 The Union submits this *amicus* brief in support of Plaintiffs’ impending Motion for a  
24 Preliminary Injunction in the event that the meet and confer process ordered by the Court on  
25 November 9, 2017 is not successful.

26 **III. *AMICUS CURIAE*’S EXPERTISE WILL BENEFIT THIS COURT**

27 The attached *amicus* brief consists primarily of statutes and cases that are not addressed in  
28 Plaintiffs’ Motion for a TRO or Defendant’s Opposition, but which provide further support for

1 the principles raised by the parties regarding the need to protect employees of the Defendant  
2 School District from unwarranted intrusion into their privacy by the Intervenor in this matter.  
3 First, the proposed *amicus* brief underscores that the California Public Records Act is not a  
4 vehicle that can be used to trump the Constitutional Right of Privacy that is enjoyed by  
5 Californians. Second, the *amicus* brief focuses on expressed exemptions in the California Public  
6 Records Act that are aimed at protecting individual privacy interests. In particular, the brief  
7 focuses on the exemption applicable to personnel, medical and similar records, the exemption  
8 protecting from disclosure the personal addresses, home telephone numbers, personal cellular  
9 telephone numbers, birthdates, and personal email addresses of public employees, as well as the  
10 public interest exemption. Finally, the *amicus* brief provides this Court an argument on the right  
11 of unionized employees “to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely”  
12 and to engage in such protected activity free of unlawful interference by the Government.

13 In essence, the Union seeks to bring to the Court’s attention the important privacy  
14 interests at stake in this case, particularly for all union activists working in the California public  
15 sector who are not parties to the case but who will nonetheless be harmed if there is precedent  
16 that allows a self-described conservative organization to use the California Public Records Act to  
17 obtain their identities and/or their private communications expressing opinions on political or  
18 social issues of public concern that are unrelated to the “public’s business” conducted by the  
19 public agency that is their employer.

20 For the foregoing reasons, the Union respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion  
21 and accept the proposed *amicus curiae* brief.

22 Dated: December 1, 2017

WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD  
A Professional Corporation

23  
24 By: /S/ Manuel A. Boígues  
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26 Attorneys for *Amicus Curiae*  
Berkeley Federation of Teachers, AFT Local 1078  
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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES**

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 This case involves an impending Motion for a Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiffs Yvette  
4 Felarca, Lori Nixon, and Larry Stefl (collectively “Plaintiffs”), who are teachers and staff at the  
5 Martin Luther King, Jr. Middle School in Berkeley, California (the “MLK Middle School”),  
6 seeking to enjoin Defendants Berkeley Unified School District, Donald Evans, and Janet  
7 Levenston (collectively “Defendant School District”) from providing documents to Intervenor,  
8 Judicial Watch, Inc. (hereinafter “Intervenor”), a self-described conservative organization based  
9 in Washington, D.C., in response to a troublesome request for documents that Intervenor made  
10 under the guise of the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”).

11 In their Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiffs argued, and this *Amicus*  
12 party agrees, that the disclosure of documents in response to Intervenor’s CPRA request would  
13 violate the privacy rights of the Defendant School District’s employees and chill their freedom of  
14 speech, freedom of association, and right to engage in union activities. The Defendant School  
15 District filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a TRO on the basis that it intended to  
16 comply with Intervenor’s CPRA request by only providing such information that is required by  
17 law, which it explained would include only emails related to the public business of the Defendant  
18 School District, and that it would adequately protect Plaintiffs’ privacy interest by redacting all  
19 teacher identifying information. While this *Amicus* party also agrees with the Defendant School  
20 District that Intervenor is not entitled to any teacher identifying information and that at most  
21 Intervenor should be provided only emails that relate to the public business of the Defendant  
22 School District, this *amicus* brief is submitted to emphasize additional privacy protections that  
23 must be considered when evaluating what documents, if any, should be provided in response to  
24 Intervenor’s CPRA request based on the facts in this particular case.

25 The preliminary injunction that Plaintiffs may seek would serve to protect the privacy  
26 interests of the Defendant School District’s employees and there is no public interest that would  
27 be advanced by the wholesale production of documents to Intervenor. This *Amicus* party  
28 therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant Plaintiffs’ request for a Preliminary Injunction.





### III. ARGUMENT

#### A. THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY TRUMPS INTERVENOR'S FISHING EXPEDITION FOR THE PRIVATE INFORMATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

In 1968, the California Legislature enacted the California Public Records Act ("CPRA"). Cal. Gov. Code § 6250 *et seq.* The CPRA was modeled after the federal Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), which had been enacted a year earlier. 5 U.S.C. § 552 *et seq.* The purpose of the CPRA and FOIA was to allow the public to scrutinize and hold the government accountable.

The California Legislature recognized that it had to balance the interest in government transparency with a fundamental competing interest, *i.e.*, privacy rights. Thus, in enacting the CPRA the California Legislature first noted that it was "mindful of the right of individuals to privacy." Cal. Gov. Code § 6250. The California Legislature then declared that "access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state." Cal. Gov. Code § 6250.

In balancing the competing interests of access to the "public's business" and individual privacy rights, the CPRA starts by defining "Public Records" as "any writing containing information *relating to the conduct of the public's business.*" Cal. Gov. Code § 6252(e) (emphasis added). Thus, the focus is on records that are relevant to government operations. The balance of these competing interests is further achieved through a substantial number of expressed exemptions from disclosure that are contained in the CPRA, approximately 76 of them. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 6253.2 – 6268.

But the California Legislature was not alone in its concern for the individual right to privacy. In 1972, voters in California approved a ballot initiative that added an explicit right to privacy in the California Constitution: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and *privacy.*" Cal. Const., art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).

In 1994, the California Supreme Court held that "the Privacy Initiative in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution creates a right of action against private as well as

1 government entities.” *Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.*, 7 Cal.4th 1, 20 (1994). This  
 2 means that the right to privacy in California applies even where there is no state action. All  
 3 employees of the Defendant School District therefore have an enforceable privacy interest that is  
 4 enshrined in the California Constitution regardless of the public’s right to information under the  
 5 CPRA.

6 In its analysis of the extent of the individual right to privacy, the California Supreme  
 7 Court noted in *Hill* that although “privacy” is not defined in the Privacy Initiative approved by the  
 8 voters, “[t]he Ballot Argument in favor includes broad references to a ‘right to be left alone,’  
 9 calling it a ‘fundamental and compelling interest,’ and purporting to include within its dimensions  
 10 no less than ‘our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our  
 11 personalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom to associate with the people we  
 12 choose.’” *Id.* at 20-21. While the Court found that those “broad references” provided “little  
 13 guidance in developing a workable legal definition of the state constitutional right to privacy,” the  
 14 Court went on to note that:

15 The principal focus of the Privacy Initiative is readily discernible.  
 16 The Ballot Argument warns of unnecessary information gathering,  
 17 use, and dissemination by public and private entities—images of  
 18 “government snooping,” computer stored and generated “dossiers”  
 19 and “ ‘cradle-to-grave’ profiles on every American” dominate the  
 20 framers’ appeal to the voters. (Ballot Argument, *supra*, at p. 26.)  
 21 The evil addressed is government and business conduct in  
 22 “collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information ... and  
 23 misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve  
 24 other purposes or to embarrass ....” (*Id.* at p. 27.) “The [Privacy  
 25 Initiative’s] primary purpose is to afford individuals some measure  
 26 of protection against this most modern threat to personal privacy.”  
 27 [citation omitted]

28 *Id.* at 21 (emphasis added).

As the Court explained in *Hill*, “[l]egally recognized privacy interests are generally of two  
 classes: (1) interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential  
 information (‘informational privacy’); and (2) interests in making intimate personal decisions or  
 conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference (‘autonomy  
 privacy.’).” *Id.* at 35. With respect to “information privacy,” which the *Hill* decision noted “is  
 the core value furthered by the Privacy Initiative,” the argument in favor of the initiative observed

1 that “the California constitutional right of privacy ‘prevents *government and business interests*  
2 from [1] *collecting and stockpiling* unnecessary information about us and from [2] *misusing*  
3 *information* gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.’ (Ballot  
4 Argument, *supra*, at p. 27.)” *Id.* at 36-37 (emphasis added).

5 Here, the California Constitutional Right of Privacy is significant because Intervenor’s  
6 CPRA request to the Defendant School District does not appear to be designed to obtain any  
7 information about the “public’s business.” Instead, the request from the Intervenor, which is an  
8 out-of-state, self-described conservative organization, is focused on the political and associational  
9 discussions among Plaintiffs and their colleagues that mention specific political subjects. The  
10 terms used in Intervenor’s CPRA request do not even tangentially seek “public records” that  
11 “contain information relating to the conduct of the public’s business” as required by the CPRA.  
12 Indeed, it would not be unreasonable for any teacher or staff member at the MLK Middle School  
13 who reads Intervenor’s CPRA request to conclude that Intervenor is simply intent in “*collecting*  
14 *and stockpiling unnecessary information about us*” and in “*misusing information gathered for one*  
15 *purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.*”

16 One of the many expressed exemptions in the CPRA applies to “[r]ecords, the disclosure  
17 of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law.” Cal. Gov. Code § 6254(k).  
18 The right of privacy under the California Constitution is a right that needs significant  
19 consideration as the Plaintiffs and Defendants here meet and confer over what records, if any,  
20 may be provided to Intervenor. In that regard, the Union urges that Plaintiffs and Defendants be  
21 required to conclude that Intervenor’s request is nothing more than an inappropriate fishing  
22 expedition under the CPRA to get around the Constitutional Right of Privacy enjoyed by Union  
23 members employed by the Defendant School District. The Union believes that is the intent.

24 For this reason, if Plaintiffs are required to file a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, the  
25 Union respectfully submits that the Court should order that Defendant Berkeley Unified School  
26 District not produce any documents to Intervenor.

27  
28

1 **B. THE CPRA PRIVACY EXEMPTION REGARDING PERSONNEL, MEDICAL**  
 2 **OR SIMILAR FILES PROHIBITS THE DISCLOSURE OF ANY SUCH**  
 3 **DOCUMENTS TO INTERVENOR**

4 The right to access public records, even presuming the records are legitimately related “to  
 5 the conduct of the public’s business,” is not unlimited. Relevant here is the California  
 6 Legislature’s exemption for “[p]ersonnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would  
 7 constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Cal. Gov. Code § 6254(c). This  
 8 expressed exemption is important because Intervenor has inexplicably requested the personnel  
 9 file of a member of the Union, teacher Plaintiff Felarca. The California Legislature’s decision to  
 10 exempt from disclosure the “personnel, medical, or similar files” of public employees where their  
 11 disclosure would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy needs to be enforced in  
 12 this instance because it is not unreasonable to imagine that Intervenor could expand its efforts to  
 13 *collect* and *stockpile* information in personnel files of other employees represented by the Union  
 14 or their colleagues employed by the Defendant School District and because of the risk of misuse  
 15 of that information.

16 The Union first notes that the similar exemption in FOIA regarding “personnel and  
 17 medical files and similar files” applies when disclosure to the public “would constitute a *clearly*  
 18 unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (emphasis added). In contrast,  
 19 the California Legislature did not include the term “clearly” in the CPRA exemption for  
 20 “personnel, medical, or similar files.” Without the requirement that there be a showing of a  
 21 “*clearly* unwarranted invasion of privacy” to prevent disclosure of “personnel, medical, or similar  
 22 files,” the CPRA exemption was apparently meant to be stronger than the federal exemption.

23 Applying the CPRA protection to personnel, medical or similar records, California courts  
 24 “weigh the public’s interest in disclosure against protection of privacy interests” and consider  
 25 whether the information in the records will “shed light” on the “public’s business” that is  
 26 conducted by the government agency. *See, e.g., Caldecott v. Superior Court*, 42 Cal.App.4th  
 27 212, 231 (2015) (holding that exemption was not applicable to documents regarding a hostile  
 28 work environment complaint against the superintendent of a school district because of strong  
 public interest in judging how the elected school board dealt with the serious misconduct

1 allegations against the highest ranking administrator); *BVR, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 143  
2 Cal.App.4th 742, 755 (2006) (holding that exemption was not applicable to documents regarding  
3 the investigation of sexual harassment and verbal abuse of students by a school district’s  
4 superintendent because of the public’s interest in knowing how the school board and the  
5 superintended responded to the allegations). In contrast to the instances where disclosure of  
6 personnel records involving serious misconduct by high ranking public officials is appropriate, it  
7 has been noted by California courts that the public interest in disclosure does not outweigh  
8 privacy interests when “trivial or groundless” charges are involved. *American Fed’n of State,  
9 County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME), Local 1650 v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 80 Cal.App.3d  
10 913, 918 (1978).

11           Moreover, even where disclosure was allowed because the information shed light on the  
12 “public’s business” involving high ranking public officials, the privacy rights of individuals other  
13 than such high ranking officials needs to be protected by redacting portions of personnel files that  
14 identify them. *See, e.g., BVR, Inc. v Superior Court, supra*, 143 Cal.App.4th 743, 759 (allowing  
15 redaction of personal information, i.e., names, home addresses, phone numbers, and job titles, of  
16 teachers, parents, students, and staff mentioned in the documents because their information was  
17 not relevant to the public’s interest in obtaining information about the investigation).

18           Here, Intervenor made a broad request for Plaintiff Felarca’s entire personnel file. With  
19 such a broad request, there is no reasonable basis upon which it could be found that the public’s  
20 interest in disclosure of a teacher’s entire personnel file outweighs the interest in protecting the  
21 teacher’s personal privacy. Plaintiff Felarca is not a high ranking official like those individuals  
22 who were involved in the *Caldecott* and *BVR, Inc.* court decisions cited above. There is also no  
23 evidence of a strong public interest in the disclosure of information that is necessary to shed light  
24 on the “public’s business” conducted by the Defendant School District. Finally, and significantly,  
25 there is no evidence of a need to disclose private information or the identities of any other  
26 employees of the Defendant School District, or of the parents or students who may be referred to  
27 in the requested personnel record.

28

1 For this reason, if Plaintiffs are required to file a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, the  
 2 Union respectfully submits that the Court should order that Defendant Berkeley Unified School  
 3 District not produce any personnel files to Intervenor.

4 **C. THE CPRA EMPLOYEE PRIVACY EXEMPTION AND THE PUBLIC**  
 5 **INTEREST EXEMPTION ALLOW THE NON-DISCLOSURE OF NAMES,**  
 6 **HOME ADDRESSES, HOME PHONE NUMBERS, CELLULAR PHONE**  
 7 **NUMBERS, BIRTHDATES, AND EMAIL ADDRESSES TO INTERVENOR**

8 The CPRA's expressed exemption of private contact information from the definition of  
 9 public records is another reason to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. The  
 10 CPRA has long provided that, with limited exceptions, the "home addresses, home telephone  
 11 numbers, personal cellular telephone numbers, and birth dates of all employees of a public agency  
 12 shall not be deemed to be public records and shall not be open to public inspection." Cal. Gov.  
 13 Code § 6254.3(a). There are four limited exceptions to this prohibition, namely that such private  
 14 information may be disclosed to (1) "an agent, or a family member" of the public employee;  
 15 (2) "an officer or employee of another public agency when necessary for the performance of its  
 16 official duties"; (3) "an employee organization pursuant to regulations and decisions of the Public  
 17 Employment Relations Board, except that the home addresses and any phone numbers on file  
 18 with the employer of employees performing law enforcement-related functions, and the birth date  
 19 of any employee, shall not be disclosed"; and (4) "an agent or employee of a health benefit plan  
 20 providing health services or administering claims for health services to public agencies and their  
 21 enrolled dependents, for the purpose of providing the health services or administering claims for  
 22 employees and their enrolled dependents." Cal. Gov. Code § 6254.3(a)(1)-(4).

23 In June of 2017, Section 6254.3 was amended to add that "...the personal email addresses  
 24 of all employees of a public agency shall not be deemed to be public records and shall not be  
 25 open to public inspection, except that disclosure of that information may be made as specified in  
 26 paragraphs (1) to (4), inclusive, of subdivision (a)." Cal. Gov. Code § 6254.3(b). The CPRA also  
 27 provides a procedure for public employees to opt out of the disclosure of information to employee  
 28 organizations by sending a written request to the public agency. Cal. Gov. Code § 6254.3(c).



1 Here, Intervenor does not fall within any of the four exceptions to the prohibition in the  
2 CPRA regarding the disclosure of private contact information about public employees. As a  
3 result, Intervenor cannot be provided any of the private information covered by Section 6254.3 of  
4 the CPRA. This is significantly important under the facts in this matter, where it is not  
5 unreasonable for Union represented employees to fear that the disclosure of such private  
6 information to a third-party like Intervenor would put their safety at risk. Indeed, the reality of  
7 such concerns is noted in Plaintiffs' Complaint. *See* Complaint, ¶ 38. As a result, the Union  
8 urges that Plaintiffs and Defendants be required to apply this exemption when meeting and  
9 conferring about what documents, if any, can be provided to Intervenor.

10 The Union acknowledges that in 2007, the California Supreme Court ruled that the salary  
11 information of public employees is not exempt from disclosure because such information sheds  
12 light on the public's business. *See International Fed'n of Prof. & Tech Eng'rs, Local 21, AFL-*  
13 *CIO v. Superior Court*, 42 Cal.4th 319 (2007) (allowing the disclosure of names and salaries of  
14 public employees earning \$100,000 or more per year based on the public's interest in knowing  
15 how the government spends its money.) The Court's decision is consistent with Section 6254.8  
16 of the CPRA, which provides that "[e]very employment contract between a state or local agency  
17 and any public official or public employee is a public record which is not subject to the provisions  
18 of Sections 6254 and 6255." Cal. Gov. Code § 6254.8. But the Union notes that the Californai  
19 Supreme Court's decision did not deal with the disclosure of any of the information exempted by  
20 Section 6254.3 of the CPRA.

21 More importantly, as noted in the previous section above, California courts have  
22 authorized the redaction of the names of public employees where their disclosure does not shed  
23 light on the public's business. *See, e.g., BVR, Inc. v Superior Court, supra*, 143 Cal.App.4th 743,  
24 759. The non-disclosure of information or the redaction of information is expressly authorized by  
25 the CPRA's public interest (or catch-all) exemption, which provides that disclosure of  
26 information is not required when it can be shown that "on the facts of the particular case the  
27 public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by  
28 disclosure of the record." Cal. Gov. Code § 6255(a). In this case, there is no evidence of any

1 public interest that would be served by the disclosure of the names of teachers, students, or  
2 parents in the specific documents requested by Intervenor. On the other hand, there is a  
3 significant concern, recognized by Plaintiffs and Defendants, regarding the safety of all members  
4 of the school community should the identities of staff, students, or parents be disclosed in the  
5 documents requested by Intervenor. Thus, under these facts, the public interest served by non-  
6 disclosure of identifying information clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of  
7 such information to Intervenor. *See Los Angeles Unified School District v. Superior Court*, 228  
8 Cal.App.4th 222 (2014) (applying the balancing test set forth in Section 6255 and finding that the  
9 school district did not have to disclose teacher identifying information).

10 As a result, the Union submits that when meeting and conferring, Plaintiffs and  
11 Defendants should be required to redact information found in any of the public records that  
12 Intervenor may be entitled to, if any, which identify any employee of the Defendant School  
13 District or any student or parent. In addition, any personal home addresses, telephone or cellular  
14 numbers, birthdates, and email addresses of public employees cannot be disclosed to Intervenor.

15 Finally, if Plaintiffs are required to file a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, the Union  
16 respectfully submits that the Court should order that Defendant Berkeley Unified School District  
17 not produce any identifying information or personal contact information to Intervenor.

18 **D. DISCLOSURE OF IDENTIFYING INFORMATION TO INTERVENOR WOULD**  
19 **INTERFERE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS OF**  
20 **PUBLIC EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY THE UNION**

21 In California, public employees enjoy the right to bargain collectively as a result of  
22 several different statutes enacted by the California Legislature covering specific categories of  
23 public employees. *See Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public*  
24 *Employment Relations Bd.*, 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1084-86 (2005). School district employees are  
25 covered by the Educational Employment Relations Act (“EERA”). *See* Cal. Gov. Code § 3540 *et*  
26 *seq.* Pursuant to the EERA, public school employees enjoy the right to engage in protected  
27 activity, which includes forming, joining, and participating in activities of an employee  
28 organization for the purposes of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations.  
Cal. Gov.Code § 3543(a).



1 Here, there is no dispute that employees of the Defendant School District use the School  
2 District's email system for personal use. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, "[m]any  
3 employers expect or at least tolerate personal use of [electronic communications] equipment by  
4 employees because it often increases worker efficiency." *City of Ontario v. Quon*, 560 U.S. 746,  
5 759 (2010). In today's digital age, it is highly likely that email systems will be used by members  
6 of the Union to communicate with each other and their union building representatives about their  
7 union protected activities. Indeed, when an employer permits its employees to use the e-mail  
8 system for personal use, the employer creates "a natural gathering place for employees" to  
9 communicate concerning wages, hours, and working conditions. *Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB*,  
10 437 U.S. 483 (1978).

11 Intervenor's public records request at issue in this case specifically seeks "any and all  
12 records of communications" among employees of the Defendant School District that mention  
13 Plaintiff Felarca and/or terms that identify a particular political group that Intervenor appears to  
14 be keenly interested in. The communications requested by Intervenor will undoubtedly include  
15 emails among the teachers and other staff at the MLK Middle School on subjects beyond the  
16 political group that is the target of Intervenor's CPRA request. It is more than reasonable to  
17 expect that the disclosure of such emails to Intervenor will include discussions among employees  
18 regarding their union protected activities, which will identify them as members of the Union.  
19 Thus, the Union is concerned about Intervenor's use of the CPRA as an end-around to the  
20 constitutional protections afforded to union membership lists.

21 Membership lists are the most valuable asset held by labor unions. This information has  
22 historically been closely guarded by unions in order to protect the associational rights of members  
23 and their right to privacy. *See Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex*  
24 *rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (order requiring production of names and addresses of  
25 all members and agents was a denial of due process as entailing likelihood of a substantial  
26 restraint upon members' exercise of their right to freedom of association); *Brock v. Local 375,*  
27 *Plumbers Int'l Union of America, AFL-CIO*, 860 F.2d 346, 349 (9th Cir. 1988) (information  
28 sought must be relevant and material to the investigation and disclosure of such material cannot

1 “chill” the first amendment rights of free association); *Dole v. Serv. Employees Union, AFL-CIO,*  
 2 *Local 280*, 950 F.2d 1456, 1462-63 (9th Cir. 1991) (protective order appropriate where Union  
 3 made adequate showing that governmental action “would have the *practical effect* ‘of  
 4 discouraging’ the exercise of constitutionally protected political rights”).

5 Allowing Intervenor to use the CPRA as a vehicle to obtain emails that identify the  
 6 Defendant School District’s employees who are members of the Union "would have the practical  
 7 effect `of discouraging' the exercise of constitutionally protected political rights." *NAACP v.*  
 8 *Alabama, supra*, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (quoting *American Communications Ass'n v. Douds*, 339 U.S.  
 9 382, 393 (1950)). Such information can also be used by anyone else who obtains access to it  
 10 from Intervenor to interfere with the safety of members of the Union or to harass them in  
 11 retaliation for their participation in protected activities.

12 As a result, the Union further submits that when meeting and conferring, Plaintiffs and  
 13 Defendants must be ordered to redact information found in any of the public records that  
 14 Intervenor may be entitled to, if any, where the information or topics discussed would identify  
 15 any employee of the Defendant School District as a member of the Union. If Plaintiffs are  
 16 required to file a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, the Union respectfully submits that the  
 17 Court should order that Defendant Berkeley Unified School District not produce any documents  
 18 to Intervenor that contain information identifying employees as members of the Union.

19 **IV. CONCLUSION**

20 For the foregoing reasons, *Amicus Curiae* Berkeley Federation of Teachers respectfully  
 21 submits that the Court should enter a Preliminary Injunction in favor of the Plaintiffs.

22 Dated: December 1, 2017

WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD  
 A Professional Corporation

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